How	Afghanistan's	Public	Procurement	Reform	is	Changing:	What	has	changed,	what	has achieved	and	whose	benefits	are	at	stake? By:	Mohammad	Adil	Zahed As	envisioned	in	his	election	manifesto	and	soon	after	being	elevated	as	the	new	President	of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani issued a legislative decree to reform public procurement of Afghanistan (Ghani, 2014). The reform	was initiated	by	merging the	existing	procurement entities	and	establishing	a	central	regulatory	body,	the	National	Procurement	Authority	(AoP, 2014). It came at a time when the prolonged and disputed presidential election caused massive	delays	to	the	procurement	process	of	development	projects. For	a	newly	formed	entity	it	was	challenging	to	both	establish	and	operate	at	the	same	time. Clearing the massive backlog of procurement, responding to the demands of both the procurement	entities	and	the	donors	in	terms	of	proceeding	with	the	procurement	of	new projects,	and	dealing	with	the	urgent	need	of	security	sector's	fuel	and	food	contracts	can	be enumerated	as	major	challenges. What	has	changed? This institutional reform	was	not	warmly	welcomed initially	by	many including	politicians, legislatures,	bureaucrats,	and	donors.	It	was	considered	to	be	centralization	of	authority	by the Office of the President. While comparing the pre and post reform organizational structure,	centralization	of	authority	is	less	apparent.	A	special	procurement	commission	to approve	above	threshold	contracts,	Afghanistan	Reconstruction	and	Development	Services (ARDS)	to	facilitate	procurement	processes,	and	Procurement	Policy	Unit	to	formulate	and provide policy guidance were functioning previously in the public procurement sector of Afghanistan	(Ministry	of	Justice,	2008). The functions of the	National Procurement	Authority (NPA) are adequately similar to the former	structure	in	terms	of	authority	distribution,	hierarchical	arrangement,	and	contracts award	authority	(NPA,	2016).	The	reform	principally	addressed	the	key	flaws	of	the	former dispersed	organizational	structure:	lack	of	coordination,	duplication	of	responsibilities,	and spread	out	functions	(OECD,	2008)	that	have	not	only	caused	hindrance	for	the	procurement entities	but	resulted	in	reduced	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	the	procurement	processes. What	has	achieved? The political and programmatic success of public procurement reform has been acknowledged both domestically and internationally. Afghanistan's commitments to the Tokyo	Mutual	Accountability	Framework	(TMAF)	and	renewed	commitments	at	the	London Conference	on	Afghanistan	2014	were	greatly	concentrated	on	reforms	and	as	wished-for, this	reform	has	satisfied	its	aimed	onlookers	particularly	the	international	community.	NPA's focus on increasing efficiency, effectiveness and value for money by meritocratic appointments	and	the	introduction	of	transparent	and	accountable	systems	have	played	an important	role	in	achieving	its	intended	objectives.	United	States'	Special	Inspector	General for	Afghanistan	Reconstruction	SIGAR's	recent	report	to	the	U.S	Congress	recognized	these steps	encouraging	in	the	fight	against	corruption	(SIGAR,	2017).	Transparency	International calls	it	a	"One	bright	spot"	in	the	government's	fight	against	corruption	by	saving	more	than $200	million that	might have been lost to corruption (Transparency International, 2016). Afghanistan	has	also	scored	well	in	World	Bank's	2016	benchmarking	public	procurement	in both thematic areas of procurement lifecycle and complaint and reporting mechanisms (World Bank, 2016). Furthermore, Afghanistan's score in Transparency International's CPI index	has	also	witnessed	a	significant	improvement	in	2016	compare	to	the	earlier	four	years. The	recent	agreement	on implementing	Open	Contracting	Data	Standards	(OCDS)	will	also increase	transparency	through	increased	community	engagement	and	citizens'	participation. Whose	benefits	are	at	stake? Public	procurement	is	politically	sensitive	because	of	substantial	public	money	involvement. In Afghanistan, the main causes and practices of corruption varies from administrative corruption,	clientelism	and	patronage	to	low	pay	and	bribery	(Singh,	2016).	Corrupt	parasitic and	monopolistic	networks	within	and	outside	governments	are	mostly	those	affected	by	the anti-corruption	reforms.	Resistance	to	this	reform	can	be	divided	into	two	broad	categories. The	first	category	is	street	level	bureaucrats	who	demonstrate	rigidity	not	due	to	personal interest	but	because	of	historical	inertia	and	no	willingness	to	change.	The	second	category are	those	whose	personal	interests	are	at	stake.	These	include	elite	and	influential	public	and private	actors	both	within	and	outside	government. Afghanistan, unfortunately	where corruption is systematic and embedded in political and economic systems, sustainable anti-corruption reform is a pre-requisite to sustainable development. Close coordination and regular communication between the procurement entities	and	as	a	whole	the	government	institutions	can	play	an	important	role	in	increasing accessibility	and	reducing	political	and	bureaucratic	blame	games.	Moreover,	addressing	a single	element	in	isolation	to	other	institutional	pillars	of	a	national	integrity	system	(Pope, 2000)	cannot	guarantee	success	but	reforms	shall	be	initiated	under	a	unified	reform	strategy. The reform strategy needs to consider certain institutional pillars such as judiciary, civil service,	watchdog	agencies, civil society	and	others in	order to	prevent	corruption	at first place	rather	than	relying	on	penalties	after	the	event.	Countries	where	corruption	is	worse, alongside institutional reforms, social empowerment is equally important and can play a critical role in the fight against corruption (Johnston, 1998). Engaging civil society and providing	public	access	to	documents	can	also	add	value	to	the	reform	initiatives	and	assist the	state	in	gaining	trust	and	increasing	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	its	people. President	Ghani's	efforts	of	fight	against	corruption	are	paying	off	in	terms	of	regaining	the trust	of	international	community	by	demonstrating	strong	political	will	to	root	out	corruption from Afghanistan and to increase effectiveness of the foreign aids. However, continuous support	of	the	international	community	is	essential	in	order	to	sustain	these	reforms. References: Administrative	Office	of	the	President	(AoP).	(2014).	Presidential	Legislative	Decree	No.:	16. Kabul.:Presidential	Palace. Ashraf	Ghani.	(2014).	Change	and	Continuity:	Ashraf	Ghani	Presidential	Election	Manifesto. Kabul:	Ashraf	Ghani	Campaign	Office. Johnston,	M.	(1998).	Fighting	systemic	corruption:	Social	foundations	for	institutional	reform. The	European	Journal	of	Development	Research,	10(1),	85-104. Ministry	of	Justice,	2008.	Procurement	Law.	Kabul:	Ministry	of	Justice. NPA	(2016).	Strategic	Plan:	20162020.	Kabul:	National	Procurement	Authority OECD (2008). Assessment of National Procurement Systems: Common Benchmarking & Assessment	Methodology.	Kabul.:	OECD. Pope, J. (2000).	TI	Source	Book	2000:	Confronting	Corruption:	The	Elements	of	a	National Integrity	System. SIGAR,	2017.	Quarterly	Report	to	the	United	States	Congress:	The	Need	to	Continue	Afghan Procurement	Reform.	Virginia:	SIGAR. Singh,	D.	(2016).	Anti-corruption	Strategies	in	Afghanistan:	An	Alternative	Approach.	Journal of	Developing	Societies,	32(1),	44-72. Transparency International. (2016). Afghanistan Must Refocus Efforts to Fight Against Corruption to Safeguard US$12 Billion in New Aid [Online]. Available at: http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/afghanistan_must_refocus_efforts_to_fig ht_against_corruption_to_safeguard_u	[Accessed	19/06/	2017]. World	Bank.	(2016).	Assessing	Public	Procurement	Systems	in	77	Economies.	URL:	http://bpp. worldbank.org/~/media/WBG/BPP/Documents/Reports/Benchmarking-PublicProcurement2016.	Pdf	[Accessed	20/06/2017]